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S U M M A R Y
Objectives: Despite the epidemic nature of Lassa fever (LF), details of outbreaks and response strategies
have not been well documented in resource-poor settings. We describe the course of a LF outbreak in
Ebonyi State, Nigeria, during January to March 2012.
Methods: We analyzed clinical, epidemiological, and laboratory data from surveillance records and
hospital statistics during the outbreak. Fisher’s exact tests were used to compare proportions and t-tests
to compare differences in means.
Results: The outbreak response consisted of effective coordination, laboratory testing, active surveillance,
community mobilization, contact and suspected case evaluation, and case management. Twenty LF cases
(10 conﬁrmed and 10 suspected) were recorded during the outbreak. Nosocomial transmission to six health
workers occurred through the index case. Only 1/110 contacts had an asymptomatic infection. Overall,
there was high case fatality rate among all cases (6/20; 30%). Patients who received ribavirin were less likely
to die than those who did not (p = 0.003). The mean delay to presentation for patients who died was 11  3.5
days, while for those who survived was 6  2.6 days (p < 0.001).
Conclusions: The response strategies contained the epidemic. Challenges to control efforts included poor
local laboratory capacity, inadequate/poor quality of protective materials, fear among health workers,
and inadequate emergency preparedness.
 2013 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Lassa fever (LF) is caused by a single-stranded RNA virus of the
family Arenaviridae. It is endemic in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
and parts of Nigeria, and also in other countries in the West African
sub-region.1 It is also a zoonotic disease, whose animal reservoir is
a rat of the genus Mastomys (the ‘multimammate’ rat). People
become infected through direct exposure to the excreta of infected
rats, or by transmission from person to person via body ﬂuids.1
Lassa infection is asymptomatic in about 80% of cases, but causes
an acute illness in the rest. Fever and general weakness are* Corresponding author. Tel.: +234 08036243196.
E-mail addresses: ukwajakingsley@yahoo.co.uk, ukwaja.kingsley@gmail.com
(K.N. Ukwaja).
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2013.05.015followed by headache, chest pain, vomiting, diarrhea, cough,
pleural effusion, bleeding from oriﬁces, and in the late stages
sometimes disorientation and coma.2 Deafness occurs in 25% of
cases. In fatal cases, it kills rapidly – usually within 14 days. The
overall case fatality rate is around 1%, rising to 15% of hospitalized
cases.1
Worldwide, an estimated two million persons are affected
every year, resulting in 5000 to 10 000 deaths.3 It is estimated
that 300 000 to 500 000 cases of LF occur annually across West
Africa.4 LF is endemic in West Africa and high rates of
seroprevalence have been reported in Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Guinea, and Liberia.5–8 In Nigeria, the seroprevalence of LF is
about 21%.8 It is an epidemic-prone disease dreaded by health
workers and the community. The threat of LF as an epidemic-
prone disease in Nigeria is indicated by an alert threshold of ases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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conﬁrmed case, by the Nigeria Federal Ministry of Health.9
Since the identiﬁcation of the virus in 1969, some outbreaks of
the disease have been reported in various parts of Nigeria
including Ekpoma, Aboh-Mbaise, Onitsha, Jos, and Laﬁa,7,10,11
and more recently in Ebonyi, Taraba, Nasarawa, Yobe, Rivers,
Ondo, and Edo states.12–14
Despite the epidemic nature of LF in Nigeria and other African
countries, the details of outbreaks and subsequent responses to
contain it have not been well documented in these places, and it is
difﬁcult to learn from these experiences to improve the
management of future outbreaks. Available Nigerian reports
have focused mainly on a nosocomial outbreak that occurred
almost two decades ago,7 or more recently on laboratory
diagnosis of blood samples of suspected cases sent to a national
reference laboratory.12,13 Thus limited information exists regard-
ing the containment and management of cases and suspects
during outbreak situations.
We report on the investigation and management of the LF
outbreak that occurred from January 1 to March 25, 2012 in
Ebonyi State, Nigeria. Our speciﬁc objectives were: to describe the
socio-demographic characteristics, clinical characteristics, and
the management outcome of the cases seen, to describe the
outbreak response, and to attempt to draw lessons for future
outbreaks.
2. Methods
2.1. Study area and population
Ebonyi State is located in the southeastern geopolitical
zone of Nigeria. It has 13 local government areas and an
estimated population of 2.5 million people.15 About 80% of the
population are subsistence farmers and a similar proportion
resides in rural areas.15 The patients studied were managed at
the Federal Teaching Hospital, Abakaliki (FETHA), Ebonyi State,
in southeastern Nigeria. The hospital services the urban and
semi-urban agrarian communities in Ebonyi State. It is the only
tertiary referral center serving an estimated three million
population in the southeastern region of Nigeria and receives
referrals from neighboring states including Cross River and
Akwa Ibom.Table 1
Deﬁnitions used in the study
Variable Deﬁnition
Lassa fever diagnosisa
Alert case Unexplained fever for 5 days or more not re
community or hospital
Action to be taken: invite the Lassa fever te
Suspected casea Illness with gradual onset with one or more
diarrhea, myalgia, chest pain, hearing loss, b
suspected case of Lassa fever. And has recei
Action to be taken: declare ‘suspected’ case
Laboratory conﬁrmed case A suspected case that is laboratory conﬁrme
Action to be taken: for Lassa fever treatmen
Epidemiologically conﬁrmed case A suspected case that is epidemiologically l
conﬁrmed case, with signs and symptoms c
unavailable or tested negative)
Action to be taken: for Lassa fever treatmen
Final outcome
Dead Conﬁrmed/suspected cases who died from L
Survived Conﬁrmed/suspected cases who recovered f
Contacta
Contact Someone who slept in the same household a
touched his/her linens or body ﬂuids
a Deﬁnitions based on: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and World Health O
the African region. Atlanta, GA: CDC; 2010, p. 1–416.162.2. Data sources and methods
We retrospectively analyzed surveillance data, hospital records,
and the outbreak response activities. Additional information about
the affected LF patients was collected from the individual clinical
records. We collected data on the onset of the outbreak and the
management of individual patients. For suspected and conﬁrmed
LF cases, we collected data on their socio-demographic and clinical
characteristics (age, sex, residence, occupation, most likely source
of exposure, clinical presentation, and laboratory data), as well as
the ﬁnal outcome of their management. Additional information
related to timing of events was also collected.
2.3. Diagnosis
All patients/contacts with features suggestive of LF (alert cases)
were evaluated clinically and were classiﬁed using the World
Health Organization (WHO)/Integrated Disease Surveillance and
Response (IDSR) guidelines as suspected cases16 (Table 1).
Conﬁrmation was based on a positive test using Lassa virus-
speciﬁc reverse-transcriptase PCR (RT-PCR), or epidemiologically
(Table 1).16 Laboratory conﬁrmation was performed at the
Institute of Lassa Fever Research and Control, Irrua Specialist
Teaching Hospital, Edo State, Nigeria. The Lassa virus-speciﬁc
RT-PCR was performed as described previously.17
2.4. Data analysis
The data analysis was conducted using Epi Info. Continuous
variables were summarized using means  standard deviations and
medians, and categorical variables were summarized as proportions.
Categorical group comparisons were made using Fisher’s exact tests,
and continuous variables were compared using the t-tests for
differences in means.
3. Results
3.1. Outbreak detection
On January 9, 2012, the FETHA notiﬁed the Ebonyi State and
Federal Ministry of Health (MoH) of a laboratory conﬁrmed LF
case. The individual was a 25-year-old university graduatesponding to antimalarial/antibiotics (for malaria, typhoid fever) from the
chnical committee to review the case
 of the following: malaise, fever, headache, sore throat, cough, nausea, vomiting,
leeding tendency, and a history of contact with excreta of rodents or with a
ved standard treatment for fever (above) without response
, send for laboratory conﬁrmation, and may start Lassa fever treatment
d (positive IgM antibody, PCR, or virus isolation)
t
inked to a laboratory conﬁrmed case (for example, contacts of a laboratory
onsistent with Lassa fever, whose conﬁrmatory laboratory results were either
t
assa fever and/or its complications
rom Lassa fever following treatment
s the case within 1 month, or had direct contact with the case (dead or alive), or
rganization. Technical guidelines for integrated disease surveillance and response in
The  Inde x case 
1 Laboratory con firmed
3 La boratory con firmed
10 Suspected cases
Total  of 20 cases
10 Suspected
10 Confirmed 
Community cases
24 Ale rt cases
6 No socomial cases 
5 La boratory con firmed
1 Epidemiologicall y con firmed
13 Suspectedcases
Figure 1. Flow chart for alert, suspected, and conﬁrmed Lassa fever cases seen
during the outbreak, southeast Nigeria, 2012.
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national service in Rivers State, Nigeria, who had returned from
her place of assignment for the holidays. She presented to the
hospital with an 8-day history of severe body weakness, low-
grade fever, and abdominal pains. Prior to presentation, she had
received antimalarials and antipyretics based on a positive test
for malaria parasites in her blood. A pregnancy test was found to
be positive, and on further evaluation, a diagnosis of ruptured
ectopic pregnancy was made. She was subsequently booked for
emergency surgery, which was done on January 3, 2012.
However, during the operation, no evidence of a ruptured
ectopic pregnancy was found. The appendix was highly inﬂamed
and there was a copious intraperitoneal ﬂuid collection; a second
surgical team continued with the operation. An appendectomy
was done and the peritoneal cavity cleaned. Postoperatively, she
went into shock and had to be re-explored by the general
surgeons for continuing intraperitoneal bleeding. Towards the
end of the third surgery, she developed disseminated intravas-
cular coagulopathy. An experienced member of the team
suggested that in addition to other management, her blood
samples be investigated for LF. She was subsequently moved to
the intensive care unit. That same day she died. The Lassa virus
RT-PCR investigation results, which returned on the fourth day
post-operation, conﬁrmed that she had had LF.
On January 8, 2012, one of the health personnel who had
performed the surgery developed high-grade fever, marked body
weakness, sore throat, and vomiting. Laboratory investigations for
malaria tested positive; this was treated with antimalarials and
antibiotics without any improvement. He was admitted to an
interim isolation ward and was evaluated by an experienced
physician who made a diagnosis of ‘suspected LF’. Blood samples
were collected and sent for laboratory conﬁrmation of LF and
he was commenced on parenteral ribavirin. Beyond this case,
ﬁve other members of the team that performed the surgery
came down with similar symptoms within the next 7 days.
Laboratory results of the ﬁrst surgeon to become ill returned and
did not conﬁrm that he was infected with LF initially; however a
repeat test carried out 2 days later was positive. He was
transferred to a makeshift isolation ward in the hospital. Blood
samples of the remaining members of the surgical team were
collected and submitted for conﬁrmation of LF, and all except one
was conﬁrmed by RT-PCR. This was when the LF Management
Committee was established and local and national resources
mobilized to respond to the outbreak.
3.2. Outbreak response strategies
3.2.1. Coordination
The response strategies were coordinated by the hospital LF
Management Committee – a multidisciplinary technical commit-
tee consisting of physicians, surgeons, pediatricians, epidemiolo-
gists, and community physicians. This technical committee was
charged with the evaluation and management of suspected LF
cases. The committee met three times weekly and updated all
sectors of the hospital involved in the response. It also liaised with
the national task-force team involved in the national response to
the LF outbreak nationwide for personal protective equipment,
ribavirin, etc., and with the Ebonyi State MoH, which had already
set-up a task-force charged with public mobilization and educa-
tion, active surveillance, and contact investigation.
3.2.2. Active surveillance and community mobilization
Several programs for public advocacy were conducted at the
state and district levels. Information on LF was disseminated to the
public through various channels – print and electronic media,
television adverts and radio, posters and banners, as well asperson-to-person communication. The main content of the
messages was the discouragement of eating rats and poorly
stored/rat-infested foods, symptoms of LF, and routes of transmis-
sion. Community and religious leaders were mobilized and
empowered to inform and educate their members. Information
on safe referral practices to the nearest hospital was also
disseminated. At the community level, health care workers were
trained on how to identify and appropriately refer alert cases
brought to their various hospitals. They also reported any such
cases to the Ebonyi State MoH task-force committee, who arranged
for their transportation to FETHA for evaluation. Algorithms were
provided to the health workers for the evaluation of alert cases.
3.2.3. Suspect and contact evaluation
Twenty-four ‘alert’ cases of community-acquired LF were
admitted to the hospital. Of these, 13 were classiﬁed as ‘suspected’
cases, and three of them were tested and laboratory conﬁrmed.
Overall, 20 cases (10 suspected and 10 conﬁrmed) were identiﬁed,
consisting of the index case plus the 6 nosocomial cases and a
further 13 from the community. Of these, nine were laboratory
conﬁrmed LF (i.e., the index case, ﬁve nosocomial cases, and three
of the 13 community-acquired cases); one case was epidemiologi-
cally conﬁrmed (by positive signs and symptoms, and contact with
a conﬁrmed case) and the remaining 10 cases were classiﬁed as
‘suspected’ LF based on clinical criteria because laboratory
conﬁrmation was not possible for logistical reasons (Figure 1).
Furthermore, a total 110 individuals were identiﬁed as high-risk
contacts of LF cases (70 family contacts and 40 hospital contacts).
One of the contacts, a health care worker, had evidence of LF
infection (based on Lassa virus RT-PCR), but without any
symptoms.
3.2.4. Epidemiological characteristics
The age of the suspected and conﬁrmed cases (n = 20) ranged
from 12 to 47 years, with a median of 36 years. Fourteen (70%)
were males, 15 (75%) resided in the urban area, and 10 (50%) were
health care workers (seven doctors, one nurse, and two auxiliary
nurses). Also, six (30%) had had contact with a conﬁrmed case
Table 2
Demographic and clinical characteristics of Lassa fever cases, southeast Nigeria,
2012
Variable Frequency (N = 20) Percentage (%)
Gender
Male 14 70
Female 6 30
Age group, years
10–19 2 10
20–29 2 10
30–39 12 60
40 4 20
Residence
Urban 15 75
Rural 5 25
Occupation
Health care worker 10 50
Student 3 15
Cleric 2 10
Laborer 2 10
Youth corps 1 5
Other (farmer, artisan, etc.) 2 10
Case type
Conﬁrmed 10 50
Suspected 10 50
Source of infection
Exposure to conﬁrmed case 6 30
Unknown 14 70
Table 3
Clinical presentation of Lassa fever cases, southeast Nigeria, 2012
Clinical presentation Frequency (N = 20) Percentage (%)
Fever 20 100
Sore throat 14 70
Abdominal pain 17 85
Headache 7 35
Vomiting 10 50
Bloody vomiting 3 15
Bloody stool 3 15
Body pains 5 25
Body weakness 5 25
Prolonged menstruation 2 10
Spontaneous abortion 2 10
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The initial case occurred in the ﬁrst epidemiological week of 2012
in the hospital (Figure 2). Epidemiological investigations were
commenced in the ﬁrst epidemiological week of 2012 with the
evaluation of the index case. In the following weeks, there was an
initial rapid increase in cases (nosocomial cases) reaching a plateau
in the second week of 2012, and subsequently a gradual decrease.
The number of cases reported declined from the sixth epidemio-
logical week to the thirteenth epidemiological week of 2012.
Laboratory conﬁrmation was made in the ﬁrst epidemiological
week of 2012.
3.2.5. Clinical characteristics
The most common symptom in this outbreak was fever, which
occurred in 20 (100%) of the cases. This was followed by abdominal
pain (17; 85%), sore throat (14; 70%), and vomiting (10; 50%)
(Table 3). The admission temperature of the cases ranged from
38 to 40 8C with a median of 39 8C. Hemorrhagic symptoms such0 
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Figure 2. Suspected and conﬁrmed Lassa fever cases by week of presentation during
the outbreak, southeast Nigeria, 2012.as bloody vomiting and bloody stools were less common, occurring
in three (15%) of the cases. Also, two female cases presented with
fever and prolonged menstruation (more than 10 days, unlike their
usual 3–4 days of menstrual ﬂow). Furthermore, two pregnant
women who presented with fever with spontaneous abortion and
who died within 2 h of presentation were later conﬁrmed to have
been infected with LF. At presentation, only a few of the patients
had a low hemoglobin level (15%); 25% had low platelets, 25% had
lymphocytosis, 35% had lymphopenia, 30% had neutropenia, and
15% had leukopenia (Table 4). Liver transaminases were raised in
45% of cases for alanine aminotransferase (ALT), 40% of cases for
aspartate aminotransferase (AST), and 35% had both enzymes
elevated. Furthermore, 30% had raised creatinine and 35% had
raised urea. All the patients (100%) had proteinuria.
3.2.6. Case management
No isolation ward was available at FETHA at the onset of the
outbreak. However, parts of the private wards (consisting of 12
private rooms) were not in use and were converted to an interim
isolation ward exclusively for suspected and conﬁrmed LF patients.
All except the index case and three other cases who died within a
few hours of presentation were treated with ribavirin, and all
received supportive therapy (Table 5). Patients who received
ribavirin were less likely to die than those who did not (Fisher’s
exact test; p = 0.003). The mean delay to presentation for patients
who died was 11  3.5 days, while for those who survived was
6  2.6 days (t-statistic 4.3; p < 0.001). The mean duration of
treatment before the patients became afebrile was 8.2  3.8 days.
Overall, there was high case fatality rate among all cases (6/20; 30%)
and among conﬁrmed cases (4/10; 40%). Sudden progression toTable 4
Interpretations from basic investigations on Lassa fever cases, southeast Nigeria,
2012
Parameter Frequency (N = 20) Percentage (%)
Low hemoglobin 3 15
Low platelets 5 25
Leukocytosis 2 10
Leukopenia 3 15
Neutrophilia 7 35
Neutropenia 6 30
Lymphocytosis 5 25
Lymphopenia 7 35
Raised creatinine 6 30
Raised urea 7 35
Raised urea and creatinine 4 20
Raised ALT 9 45
Raised AST 8 40
Raised ALT and AST 7 35
Raised total bilirubin 6 30
Proteinuria 20 100
ALT, alanine aminotransferase; AST, aspartate aminotransferase.
Table 5
Prognosis and treatment outcome of Lassa fever cases, southeast Nigeria, 2012
Treatment given Clinical outcome Fisher’s exact
p-value
Survived
n (%)
Died
n (%)
Suspected cases only (N = 10) 0.2
Ribavirin 8 (80) 1 (10)
No ribavirin 0 (0) 1 (10)
Total 8 (80) 2 (20)
Conﬁrmed cases only (N = 10) 0.03
Ribavirin 6 (60) 1 (10)
No ribavirin 0 (0) 3 (30)
Total 6 (60) 4 (40)
All cases (N = 20) 0.003
Ribavirin 14 (70) 2 (10)
No ribavirin 0 (0) 4 (20)
Total 14 (70) 6 (30)
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the cases. Even during treatment, neurological disturbances and
deterioration in the respiratory system, kidneys, and lung function
were rapid. Death occurred due to multiple organ failure. The median
stay on the ward was 7 (range 0–12) days for fatal cases, and 10 (range
5–36) days for survivors. The contacts with asymptomatic infection
received prophylactic treatment with oral ribavirin. Alert cases who
turned out to be non-cases stayed for an average of 4 days on the
ward. All the surviving health care workers requested discharge
and transfer to the national center for LF management and care after
4–6 days of care. At the time of discharge, they no longer had fever,
but some had deterioration of their renal and hepatic function. One of
the transferred cases died at the referral center.
4. Discussion
4.1. Achievements
The outbreak in a Nigerian State described here, which was
successfully contained by a multidisciplinary collaboration be-
tween the FETHA LF technical committee, the Ebonyi State MoH
task-force, Irrua Specialist Teaching Hospital, Edo State, and
support from the Federal Ministry of Health, conﬁrmed the
susceptibility and limitations of the health system in a resource-
poor setting. The spread of LF in the hospital and community was
limited through the outbreak response efforts, which substantially
contributed to this containment. The backbone of the response
strategies was a strong collaboration of different sectors, resulting
in coordinated efforts and resource mobilization. Also, the Ebonyi
State government provided leadership with support from the
Federal Ministry of Health. Implementation relied substantially on
surveillance for cases and contacts, case management and
infection control, and availability of a Lassa virus diagnostic
facility in the country, as well as effective public information and
communication. Some of these approaches have been adopted
previously to contain other outbreaks of viral hemorrhagic
fevers.18–21
The epidemic was recognized within a week of onset. This early
detection of the outbreak by the health care delivery system in
cooperation with a diagnostic center in Nigeria is illustrated by the
epidemic curve, which shows no time lag between presentation of
the earliest case (January 1, 2012) and when the MoH was ﬁrst
notiﬁed (January 9, 2012). This early detection was a result of the
strong surveillance system and the high index of suspicion
maintained by all of the health care workers in FETHA due to
previous deaths among health workers in the center.12,13 Although
some of the health care workers who participated in the surgery of
the index case were inadvertently exposed to her body ﬂuids,
resulting in infection/disease, early detection of the outbreakensured that they were evaluated during the incubation period
until they developed the disease.
Another important factor in our success in containing the
outbreak was the strong advocacy and community information
and mobilization. This helped to alter the health care-seeking
behavior of the population and ensured that community health
workers were informed early of alert cases of LF for evaluation and
onward referral to our tertiary center. As previously documen-
ted,18,19 early detection of viral hemorrhagic fever outbreaks can
be improved by involving local communities in surveillance
activities. This strategy is currently recommended by the World
Health Organization (WHO) through the Integrated Disease
Surveillance Strategy.16 A community-based disease surveillance
strategy was thus initiated in Ebonyi State as part of an early
warning system for future LF outbreaks.
Four of the patients who died during the outbreak did not
receive ribavirin therapy. The index case was not treated
because the conﬁrmatory diagnosis did not return until her
death. The other three patients died within a few hours of
presentation. The lack of laboratory capacity for Lassa virus
detection directly at the hospital led to the suspected cases being
treated empirically with ribavirin. Overall, we had a good
management outcome. Two other patients who received ribavirin
but died, presented 2 weeks after the onset of the illness. Previous
studies have documented that the case fatality rate among LF
patients increases with increasing delays before presentation.22–
24 This underscores the importance of early presentation and
treatment with ribavirin in the management of LF.22,24
Most of the health workers directly involved in the surgery
came down with LF. This underscores the fact that direct contact
with body ﬂuids of an infected patient is a major source of
secondary infection.24 This also suggests that surgery for untreated
cases of LF may increase the likelihood of disease transmission.
Only one health worker involved in the management of the
nosocomial cases had evidence of Lassa virus infection conﬁrmed
by Lassa virus RT-PCR. The referral and transportation of cases also
presented special risks, but adopting standard precautions ensured
that none of the non-medical/medical workers involved were
infected with the disease.
The outbreak prompted informative seminars and workshops
for health workers to promote infection control in the hospital and
health facility settings. A number of approaches have been adopted
to improve infection control at the hospital since the outbreak.
First, as meticulous barrier nursing procedures and universal
precautions are usually effective in preventing infection with LF,23
protective clothing, face masks, and disposable gloves have been
provided for use during the clinical evaluation of patients in the
emergency department. Second, patients with fever who do not
respond to treatment (for common causes of fever in our
environment such as malaria and common bacterial infections)
are classiﬁed as alert cases and are isolated and further evaluated
for LF. Third, a dedicated ward (away from the medical and surgical
wards) for LF has been provided for admission and further
evaluation of suspected LF cases. Finally, after the outbreak, the
surgical operation rooms in the hospital were cleaned and
sterilized. Besides extensive training to exclude ‘suspected’ LF
based on clinical criteria among patients who require surgery and
the use of goggles during surgery, no other speciﬁc intervention
has been carried out for health workers who perform surgical
procedures.
4.2. Challenges
One of the major challenges faced during the outbreak was the
inability to conﬁrm some of the suspected cases due to ﬁnancial
and logistical reasons. Although the Lassa virus RT-PCR is provided
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was located approximately 300 km from the epicenter of the
outbreak. Conﬁrmatory diagnosis and screening of contacts
required collection of blood samples, storage, and transportation
to the reference laboratory. We had difﬁculties during these
processes. There is a need to site a diagnostic laboratory in all of the
states where LF outbreaks have occurred. This will improve early
diagnosis and conﬁrmation of cases and ensure appropriate
treatment.
Secondly, inadequate quality and/or unavailability of personal
protective materials, especially at the onset of the outbreak, were
major problems. This probably contributed to the nosocomial
transmission of the Lassa virus to one of the health care
professionals involved in the management of the LF patients
during the outbreak. There is need to ensure the availability of
quality personal protective materials, especially masks, goggles,
and gloves, and for these to be worn during outbreak situations.
Thirdly, inadequate knowledge of the disease among the
community and health workers resulted in fear of contracting
the disease. This led to a high rate of apprehension and anxiety
among the clinical staff involved in the management of the cases. It
took several education seminars and clear evidence that the barrier
nursing currently being used for the management of cases is
effective, for the conﬁdence of some of the clinical staff to return.
Fourthly, another major challenge was the inability to trace the
origin. Investigation of contacts of the cases did not yield evidence
of transmission of LF between family members and close relatives.
It is likely that the cases were infected through the consumption of
infected foods.25 Education of the community on safe handling of
foods and to stop eating rats may play a role in curtailing future
outbreaks.
Finally, the lack of epidemic preparedness for LF affected the
early containment of the outbreak. There is a need for a dedicated
ward for suspected LF cases in the State. Also, for post-outbreak
control interventions, there is a need to improve the epidemic
preparedness and response in case of a resurgence or a new LF
epidemic. Furthermore, there is a need to update the registration of
vital statistics (birth and deaths) in Ebonyi State. In the future this
will complement the efforts of ongoing active surveillance for the
early warning of epidemics.16,19 The data collected will show the
pattern of the disease burden in the community by identifying
sudden changes in the epidemiology of diseases in the State.
5. Conclusions
Several lessons learned in this outbreak could be useful in
tackling future outbreaks. These lessons include: (1) the need to
ensure effective coordination and early mobilization of resources
at the local level, involving the media and local communities in
outbreak control strategies; (2) providing efﬁcient laboratory
capacity for conﬁrmation of LF; (3) empowerment of health workers
on knowledge and preventative measures of LF; (4) ensuring that
active surveillance, a high index of suspicion, and infection control
measures are emphasized on hospital wards and in surgical
theatres; and (5) the need to sustain epidemic preparedness in
LF-prone states. There is also a need to address legal issues,
especially in relation to health workers and others involved in
outbreak control, in terms of insurance and compensation of health
workers who contract the disease.
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